draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-08.txt   draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-13.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft IIJ, Arrcus, & DRL Internet-Draft IIJ Research, Arrcus, & DRL
Updates: 8210 (if approved) R. Austein Intended status: Standards Track R. Austein
Intended status: Standards Track Dragon Research Labs Expires: 2 January 2025 Dragon Research Labs
Expires: 3 December 2022 1 June 2022 1 July 2024
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol,
Version 2 Version 2
draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-08 draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-13
Abstract Abstract
In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems and In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems and
Autonomous System Paths of BGP announcements, routers need a simple Autonomous System Paths of BGP announcements, routers need a simple
but reliable mechanism to receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure but reliable mechanism to receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RFC 6480) prefix origin data and router keys from a trusted cache. (RFC 6480) prefix origin data and router keys from a trusted cache.
This document describes a protocol to deliver them. This document describes a protocol to deliver them.
This document describes version 2 of the RPKI-Router protocol. RFC This document describes version 2 of the RPKI-Router protocol. RFC
6810 describes version 0, and RFC 8210 describes version 1. This 6810 describes version 0, and RFC 8210 describes version 1. This
document updates and replaces RFC 8210. document is compatible with both.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 December 2022. This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 January 2025.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Changes from RFC 8210 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Changes from RFC 8210 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Deployment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Deployment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Operational Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Operational Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Fields of a PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1. Fields of a PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. Serial Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.2. Serial Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3. Serial Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.3. Serial Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.4. Reset Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.4. Reset Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.5. Cache Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.5. Cache Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.6. IPv4 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.6. IPv4 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.7. IPv6 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.7. IPv6 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.8. End of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.8. End of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.9. Cache Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.9. Cache Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.10. Router Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.10. Router Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.11. Error Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5.11. Error Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.12. ASPA PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.12. ASPA PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Protocol Timing Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6. Protocol Timing Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7. Protocol Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7. Protocol Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8. Protocol Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8. Protocol Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.1. Start or Restart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8.1. Start or Restart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.2. Typical Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8.2. Typical Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.3. No Incremental Update Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 8.3. No Incremental Update Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.4. Cache Has No Data Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 8.4. Cache Has No Data Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 9. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.1. SSH Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 9.1. SSH Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.2. TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 9.2. TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9.3. TCP MD5 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 9.3. TCP MD5 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
9.4. TCP-AO Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 9.4. TCP-AO Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
10. Router-Cache Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 10. Router-Cache Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11. ROA PDU Race Minimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 11. ROA PDU Race Minimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 12. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
13. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 13. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems (ASs) In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems (ASes)
and AS paths of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable and AS paths of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable
mechanism to receive cryptographically validated Resource Public Key mechanism to receive cryptographically validated Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] prefix origin data and router keys Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] prefix origin data and router keys
from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to deliver from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to deliver
them. The design is intentionally constrained to be usable on much them. The design is intentionally constrained to be usable on much
of the current generation of ISP router platforms. of the current generation of ISP router platforms.
This document updates [RFC8210]. This specification documents version 2 of the RPKI-RTR protocol.
Earlier versions are documented in [RFC6810] and [RFC8210]. Though
this version is, of course, preferred, the earlier versions are
expected to continue to be productively deployed indefinitely, and
Section 7 details how to downgrade from this version to earlier
versions as needed in order to interoperate.
Section 3 describes the deployment structure, and Section 4 then Section 3 describes the deployment structure, and Section 4 then
presents an operational overview. The binary payloads of the presents an operational overview. The binary payloads of the
protocol are formally described in Section 5, and the expected protocol are formally described in Section 5, and the expected
Protocol Data Unit (PDU) sequences are described in Section 8. The Protocol Data Unit (PDU) sequences are described in Section 8. The
transport protocol options are described in Section 9. Section 10 transport protocol options are described in Section 9. Section 10
details how routers and caches are configured to connect and details how routers and caches are configured to connect and
authenticate. Section 12 describes likely deployment scenarios. The authenticate. Section 12 describes likely deployment scenarios. The
traditional security and IANA considerations end the document. traditional security and IANA considerations end the document.
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1.2. Changes from RFC 8210 1.2. Changes from RFC 8210
This section summarizes the significant changes between [RFC8210] and This section summarizes the significant changes between [RFC8210] and
the protocol described in this document. the protocol described in this document.
* A new ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) PDU type * A new ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) PDU type
(Section 5.12) has been added to support (Section 5.12) has been added to support
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]. [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile].
* A small Section 11 has been added to handle two ROA (Route * A small Section 11 has been added to handle two possible ROA
Origination Authorization) PDU race conditions, Break Before Make (Route Origination Authorization) PDU race conditions, Break
and Shorter Prefix First. Before Make and Shorter Prefix First.
* Language was clarified when multiple caches are configured, and an
interesting affect is noted.
* The protocol version number incremented from 1 (one) to 2 (two) * The protocol version number incremented from 1 (one) to 2 (two)
and Section 7 has been updated accordingly. and Section 7 has been updated accordingly.
2. Glossary 2. Glossary
The following terms are used with special meaning. The following terms are used with special meaning.
Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a
distributed set of servers at the IANA, Regional Internet distributed set of servers at the IANA, Regional Internet
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successor. Relying Party software is used to gather and validate successor. Relying Party software is used to gather and validate
the distributed data of the RPKI into a cache. Trusting this the distributed data of the RPKI into a cache. Trusting this
cache further is a matter between the provider of the cache and a cache further is a matter between the provider of the cache and a
Relying Party. Relying Party.
Serial Number: "Serial Number" is a 32-bit strictly increasing Serial Number: "Serial Number" is a 32-bit strictly increasing
unsigned integer which wraps from 2^32-1 to 0. It denotes the unsigned integer which wraps from 2^32-1 to 0. It denotes the
logical version of a cache. A cache increments the value when it logical version of a cache. A cache increments the value when it
successfully updates its data from a parent cache or from primary successfully updates its data from a parent cache or from primary
RPKI data. While a cache is receiving updates, new incoming data RPKI data. While a cache is receiving updates, new incoming data
and implicit deletes are associated with the new serial but MUST and implicit deletes are associated with the new Serial Number but
NOT be sent until the fetch is complete. A Serial Number is not MUST NOT be sent until the fetch is complete. A Serial Number is
commensurate between different caches or different protocol not commensurate between different caches or different protocol
versions, nor need it be maintained across resets of the cache versions, nor need it be maintained across resets of the cache
server. See [RFC1982] on DNS Serial Number Arithmetic for too server. See [RFC1982] on DNS Serial Number Arithmetic for too
much detail on the topic. much detail on the topic.
Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a Session Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a Session
ID to uniquely identify the instance of the cache and to bind it ID to uniquely identify the instance of the cache and to bind it
to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will
generate. This allows the router to restart a failed session generate. This allows the router to restart a failed session
knowing that the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with knowing that the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with
that of the cache. that of the cache.
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described in this document. It is said to be a client of the described in this document. It is said to be a client of the
cache. There MAY be mechanisms for the router to assure itself of cache. There MAY be mechanisms for the router to assure itself of
the authenticity of the cache and to authenticate itself to the the authenticity of the cache and to authenticate itself to the
cache (see Section 9). cache (see Section 9).
4. Operational Overview 4. Operational Overview
A router establishes and keeps open a transport connection to one or A router establishes and keeps open a transport connection to one or
more caches with which it has client/server relationships. It is more caches with which it has client/server relationships. It is
configured with a semi-ordered list of caches and establishes a configured with a semi-ordered list of caches and establishes a
connection to the most preferred cache, or set of caches, which connection to the most preferred cache, or set of caches with that
accept the connections. same priority, which accept the connections.
The router MUST choose the most preferred, by configuration, cache or The router MUST choose the most preferred, by configuration, cache or
set of caches so that the operator may control load on their caches set of caches so that the operator may control load on their caches
and the Global RPKI. and the Global RPKI.
Periodically, the router sends to the cache the most recent Serial A VRP is effective if it is in the fetched set from any of the
Number for which it has received data from that cache, i.e., the currently preferred caches. Therefore, a VRP takes effect on the
router's current Serial Number, in the form of a Serial Query. When router when the first cache serves that VRP, and the VRP is in effect
a router establishes a new session with a cache or wishes to reset a until the last cache withdraws that VRP. Thus, in a global sense,
current relationship, it sends a Reset Query. the effect of a VRP announcement propagates more quickly than a
withdraw,
Periodically, the router sends a Serial Query to the cache the most
recent Serial Number for which it has received data from that cache,
i.e., the router's current Serial Number, in the form of a Serial
Query. When a router establishes a new session with a cache or
wishes to reset a current relationship, it sends a Reset Query.
The cache responds to the Serial Query with all data changes which The cache responds to the Serial Query with all data changes which
took place since the given Serial Number. This may be the null set, took place since the given Serial Number. This may be the null set,
in which case the End of Data PDU (Section 5.8) is still sent. Note in which case the End of Data PDU (Section 5.8) is still sent. Note
that the Serial Number comparison used to determine "since the given that the Serial Number comparison used to determine "since the given
Serial Number" MUST take wrap-around into account; see [RFC1982]. Serial Number" MUST take wrap-around into account; see [RFC1982].
When the router has received all data records from the cache, it sets When the router has received all data records from the cache, it sets
its current Serial Number to that of the Serial Number in the its current Serial Number to that of the Serial Number in the
received End of Data PDU. received End of Data PDU.
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full transfer if for any reason the cache is unable to provide the full transfer if for any reason the cache is unable to provide the
necessary incremental data. Unlike some incremental transfer necessary incremental data. Unlike some incremental transfer
protocols, this protocol requires the router to make an explicit protocols, this protocol requires the router to make an explicit
request to start the fallback process; this is deliberate, as the request to start the fallback process; this is deliberate, as the
cache has no way of knowing whether the router has also established cache has no way of knowing whether the router has also established
sessions with other caches that may be able to provide better sessions with other caches that may be able to provide better
service. service.
As a cache server must evaluate certificates and ROAs (Route Origin As a cache server must evaluate certificates and ROAs (Route Origin
Authorizations; see [RFC6480]), which are time dependent, servers' Authorizations; see [RFC6480]), which are time dependent, servers'
clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of approximately an hour. clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of an hour.
Barring errors, transport connections remain up as long as the cache Barring errors, transport connections remain up as long as the cache
and router remain up and the router is not reconfigured to no longer and router remain up and the router is not reconfigured to no longer
use the cache. use the cache.
Should a transport connection be lost for unknown reasons, the router Should a transport connection be lost for unknown reasons, the router
SHOULD try to reestablish one; being careful to not abuse the cache SHOULD try to reestablish one; being careful to not abuse the cache
with twoo many failed requests. with two many failed requests.
5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs)
The exchanges between the cache and the router are sequences of The exchanges between the cache and the router are sequences of
exchanges of the following PDUs according to the rules described in exchanges of the following PDUs according to the rules described in
Section 8. Section 8.
Reserved fields (marked "zero" in PDU diagrams) MUST be zero on Reserved fields (marked "zero" in PDU diagrams) MUST be zero on
transmission and MUST be ignored on receipt. transmission and MUST be ignored on receipt.
5.1. Fields of a PDU 5.1. Fields of a PDU
PDUs contain the following data elements: PDUs contain the following data elements:
Protocol Version: An 8-bit unsigned integer, currently 2, denoting Protocol Version: An 8-bit unsigned integer, currently 2, denoting
the version of this protocol. the version of this protocol.
PDU Type: An 8-bit unsigned integer, denoting the type of the PDU, PDU Type: An 8-bit unsigned integer, denoting the type of the PDU,
e.g., IPv4 Prefix. e.g., IPv4 Prefix.
Serial Number: The Serial Number of the RPKI cache when this set of Serial Number: A 32-bit unsigned integer serializing the RPKI cache
PDUs was received from an upstream cache server or gathered from epoch when this set of PDUs was received from an upstream cache
the Global RPKI. A cache increments its Serial Number when server or gathered from the Global RPKI. A cache increments its
completing a rigorously validated update from a parent cache or Serial Number when completing a validated update from a parent
the Global RPKI. cache or the Global RPKI.
Session ID: A 16-bit unsigned integer. When a cache server is Session ID: A 16-bit unsigned integer. When a cache server is
started, it generates a Session ID to identify the instance of the started, it generates a Session ID to identify the instance of the
cache and to bind it to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache cache and to bind it to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache
instance will generate. This allows the router to restart a instance will generate. This allows the router to restart a
failed session knowing that the Serial Number it is using is failed session knowing that the Serial Number it is using is
commensurate with that of the cache. If, at any time after the commensurate with that of the cache. If, at any time after the
protocol version has been negotiated (Section 7), either the protocol version has been negotiated (Section 7), either the
router or the cache finds that the value of the Session ID is not router or the cache finds that the value of the Session ID is not
the same as the other's, the party which detects the mismatch MUST the same as the other's, the party which detects the mismatch MUST
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and reset the session. The one case in which the router may stay and reset the session. The one case in which the router may stay
out of sync is when nothing in the Cache Response contradicts any out of sync is when nothing in the Cache Response contradicts any
data currently held by the router. data currently held by the router.
Using persistent storage for the Session ID or a clock-based Using persistent storage for the Session ID or a clock-based
scheme for generating Session IDs should avoid the risk of Session scheme for generating Session IDs should avoid the risk of Session
ID collisions. ID collisions.
The Session ID might be a pseudorandom value, a strictly The Session ID might be a pseudorandom value, a strictly
increasing value if the cache has reliable storage, et cetera. A increasing value if the cache has reliable storage, et cetera. A
seconds-since-epoch timestamp value such as the POSIX time() seconds-since-epoch timestamp value such as the low order 16 bits
function makes a good Session ID value. of unsigned integer seconds since 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z ignoring
leap seconds might make a good Session ID value.
Length: A 32-bit unsigned integer which has as its value the count Length: A 32-bit unsigned integer which has as its value the count
of the bytes in the entire PDU, including the 8 bytes of header of the bytes in the entire PDU, including the 8 bytes of header
which includes the length field. which includes the length field.
Flags: The lowest-order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an Flags: An 8-bit binary field, with the lowest-order bit being 1 for
announcement and 0 for a withdrawal. For a Prefix PDU (IPv4 or an announcement and 0 for a withdrawal. For a Prefix PDU (IPv4 or
IPv6), the announce/withdraw flag indicates whether this PDU IPv6), the announce/withdraw flag indicates whether this PDU
announces a new right to announce the prefix or withdraws a announces a new right to announce the prefix or withdraws a
previously announced right; a withdraw effectively deletes one previously announced right; a withdraw effectively deletes one
previously announced Prefix PDU with the exact same Prefix, previously announced Prefix PDU with the exact same Prefix,
Length, Max-Len, and Autonomous System Number (ASN). Length, Max-Len, and Autonomous System Number (ASN).
Similarly, for a Router Key PDU, the flag indicates whether this Similarly, for a Router Key PDU, the flag indicates whether this
PDU announces a new Router Key or deletes one previously announced PDU announces a new Router Key or deletes one previously announced
Router Key PDU with the exact same AS Number, Router Key PDU with the exact same AS Number,
subjectKeyIdentifier, and subjectPublicKeyInfo. subjectKeyIdentifier, and subjectPublicKeyInfo.
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Max Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest prefix Max Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest prefix
allowed by the Prefix element. This MUST NOT be less than the allowed by the Prefix element. This MUST NOT be less than the
Prefix Length element. Prefix Length element.
Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA. Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA.
Autonomous System Number: A 32-bit unsigned integer representing an Autonomous System Number: A 32-bit unsigned integer representing an
ASN allowed to announce a prefix or associated with a router key. ASN allowed to announce a prefix or associated with a router key.
Subject Key Identifier: 20-octet Subject Key Identifier (SKI) value Subject Key Identifier: The 20-octet Subject Key Identifier (SKI)
of a router key, as described in [RFC6487]. value of a router key, as described in [RFC6487].
Subject Public Key Info: A router key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value,
as described in [RFC8608]. This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding of
the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and length
values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
Refresh Interval: Interval between normal cache polls. See Subject Public Key Info: A variable length field holding a router
Section 6. key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in [RFC8608]. This
is the full ASN.1 DER encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo,
including the ASN.1 tag and length values of the
subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
Retry Interval: Interval between cache poll retries after a failed Refresh Interval: A 32-bit interval in seconds between normal cache
cache poll. See Section 6. polls. See Section 6.
Expire Interval: Interval during which data fetched from a cache Retry Interval: A 32-bit interval in seconds between cache poll
remains valid in the absence of a successful subsequent cache retries after a failed cache poll. See Section 6.
poll. See Section 6.
AFI Flags: A field of the ASPA PDU where the low order bit denotes Expire Interval: A 32-bit interval in seconds during which data
whether the AS relationships are for IPv4 (0) or IPv6 (1) AFI. fetched from a cache remains valid in the absence of a successful
subsequent cache poll. See Section 6.
Provider AS Count: The number of Provider Autonomous System Numbers Provider AS Count: A 16-bit count of Provider Autonomous System
in the PDU. Numbers in the PDU.
Customer Autonomous System Number: The AS number of the Autonomous Customer Autonomous System Number: The 32-bit AS number of the
System that authorizes the upstream providers listed in the Autonomous System that authorizes the upstream providers listed in
Provider Autonomous System list to propagate prefixes of the the Provider Autonomous System list to propagate prefixes of the
specified address family other ASes. specified address family to other ASes.
Provider Autonomous System Numbers: The set of AS numbers authorized Provider Autonomous System Numbers: The set of 32-bit AS numbers
to propagate prefixes of the spacified AFI which were received authorized to propagate prefixes which were received from the
from the customer AS. customer AS.
5.2. Serial Notify 5.2. Serial Notify
The cache notifies the router that the cache has new data. The cache notifies the router that the cache has new data.
The Session ID reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are The Session ID reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are
commensurate, i.e., the cache session has not been changed. commensurate, i.e., the cache session has not been changed.
Upon receipt of a Serial Notify PDU, the router MAY issue an Upon receipt of a Serial Notify PDU, the router MAY issue an
immediate Serial Query (Section 5.3) or Reset Query (Section 5.4) immediate Serial Query (Section 5.3) or Reset Query (Section 5.4)
skipping to change at page 13, line 27 skipping to change at page 13, line 41
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| IPv4 Prefix | | IPv4 Prefix |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Autonomous System Number | | Autonomous System Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
This PDU carries an [RFC6811] Validated ROA Payload (VRP) for an IPv4
ROA.
The lowest-order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an announcement and The lowest-order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an announcement and
0 for a withdrawal. 0 for a withdrawal.
In the RPKI, nothing prevents a signing certificate from issuing two In the RPKI, nothing prevents a signing certificate from issuing two
identical ROAs. In this case, there would be no semantic difference identical ROAs. In this case, there would be no semantic difference
between the objects, merely a process redundancy. between the objects, merely a process redundancy.
In the RPKI, there is also an actual need for what might appear to a In the RPKI, there is also an actual need for what might appear to a
router as identical IPvX PDUs. This can occur when an upstream router as identical IPvX PDUs. This can occur when an upstream
certificate is being reissued or there is an address ownership certificate is being reissued or there is an address ownership
skipping to change at page 14, line 31 skipping to change at page 14, line 49
+--- IPv6 Prefix ---+ +--- IPv6 Prefix ---+
| | | |
+--- ---+ +--- ---+
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Autonomous System Number | | Autonomous System Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
This PDU carries an [RFC6811] Validated ROA Payload (VRP) for an IPv6
ROA.
Analogous to the IPv4 Prefix PDU, it has 96 more bits and no magic. Analogous to the IPv4 Prefix PDU, it has 96 more bits and no magic.
5.8. End of Data 5.8. End of Data
The cache tells the router it has no more data for the request. The cache tells the router it has no more data for the request.
The Session ID and Protocol Version MUST be the same as that of the The Session ID and Protocol Version MUST be the same as that of the
corresponding Cache Response which began the (possibly null) sequence corresponding Cache Response which began the (possibly null) sequence
of payload PDUs. of payload PDUs.
skipping to change at page 16, line 46 skipping to change at page 17, line 4
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| AS Number | | AS Number |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Subject Public Key Info | | Subject Public Key Info |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
The Router Key PDU transports an [RFC8635] Router key.
The lowest-order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an announcement and The lowest-order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an announcement and
0 for a withdrawal. 0 for a withdrawal.
The cache server MUST ensure that it has told the router client to The cache server MUST ensure that it has told the router client to
have one and only one Router Key PDU for a unique {SKI, ASN, Subject have one and only one Router Key PDU for a unique {SKI, ASN, Subject
Public Key} at any one point in time. Should the router client Public Key} at any one point in time. Should the router client
receive a Router Key PDU with a {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} receive a Router Key PDU with a {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key}
identical to one it already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate identical to one it already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate
Announcement Received error. Announcement Received error.
skipping to change at page 17, line 20 skipping to change at page 17, line 28
Public Key value may appear in multiple Router Key PDUs with Public Key value may appear in multiple Router Key PDUs with
different ASNs. In the interest of keeping the announcement and different ASNs. In the interest of keeping the announcement and
withdrawal semantics as simple as possible for the router, this withdrawal semantics as simple as possible for the router, this
protocol makes no attempt to compress either of these cases. protocol makes no attempt to compress either of these cases.
Also note that it is possible, albeit very unlikely, for multiple Also note that it is possible, albeit very unlikely, for multiple
distinct Subject Public Key values to hash to the same SKI. For this distinct Subject Public Key values to hash to the same SKI. For this
reason, implementations MUST compare Subject Public Key values as reason, implementations MUST compare Subject Public Key values as
well as SKIs when detecting duplicate PDUs. well as SKIs when detecting duplicate PDUs.
As the Subject Public Key Info is a variable length field, it must be
decoded to determine where the PDU terminates.
5.11. Error Report 5.11. Error Report
This PDU is used by either party to report an error to the other. This PDU is used by either party to report an error to the other.
Error reports are only sent as responses to other PDUs, not to report Error reports are only sent as responses to other PDUs, not to report
errors in Error Report PDUs. errors in Error Report PDUs.
Error codes are described in Section 13. Error codes are described in Section 13.
The Erroneous PDU field is a binary copy of the PDU causing the error
condition, including all fields.
If the error is generic (e.g., "Internal Error") and not associated If the error is generic (e.g., "Internal Error") and not associated
with the PDU to which it is responding, the Erroneous PDU field MUST with the PDU to which it is responding, the Erroneous PDU field MUST
be empty and the Length of Encapsulated PDU field MUST be zero. be empty and the Length of Encapsulated PDU field MUST be zero.
An Error Report PDU MUST NOT be sent for an Error Report PDU. If an An Error Report PDU MUST NOT be sent for an Error Report PDU. If an
erroneous Error Report PDU is received, the session SHOULD be erroneous Error Report PDU is received, the session SHOULD be
dropped. dropped.
If the error is associated with a PDU of excessive length, i.e., too If the error is associated with a PDU of excessive length, i.e., too
long to be any legal PDU other than another Error Report, or a long to be any legal PDU other than another Error Report, or a
possibly corrupt length, the Erroneous PDU field MAY be truncated. possibly corrupt length, the Erroneous PDU field MAY be truncated.
The diagnostic text is optional; if not present, the Length of Error The Arbitrary Text field is optional; if not present, the Length of
Text field MUST be zero. If error text is present, it MUST be a Arbitrary text field MUST be zero. If Arbitrary Text is present, it
string in UTF-8 encoding (see [RFC3629]). MUST be a string in UTF-8 encoding (see [RFC3629]) in the Queen's
English.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Error Code | | Version | Type | Error Code |
| 2 | 10 | | | 2 | 10 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length | | Length |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length of Encapsulated PDU | | Length of Encapsulated PDU |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
~ Erroneous PDU ~ ~ Erroneous PDU ~
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length of Error Text | | Length of Arbitrary Text |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Arbitrary Text | | Arbitrary Text |
| of | ~ of ~
~ Error Diagnostic Message ~ | Error Diagnostic Message |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.12. ASPA PDU 5.12. ASPA PDU
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | zero | | Version | Type | zero |
| 2 | 11 | | | 2 | 11 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length | | Length |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | | | | | |
| Flags | AFI Flags| Provider AS Count | | Flags | zero | Provider AS Count |
| | | | | | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Customer Autonomous System Number | | Customer Autonomous System Number |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
~ Provider Autonomous System Numbers ~ ~ Provider Autonomous System Numbers ~
| | | |
~-------------------------------------------~ ~-------------------------------------------~
The ASPA PDU supports [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]. An ASPA PDU The ASPA PDU supports [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]. An ASPA PDU
represents one single customer AS and its provider ASs for a represents one single customer AS and its provider ASes. Receipt of
particular Address Family. Receipt of an ASPA PDU announcement an ASPA PDU announcement (announce/withdraw flag == 1) when the
(announce/withdraw flag == 1) when the router already has an ASPA PDU router already has an ASPA PDU with the same Customer Autonomous
with the same Customer Autonomous System Number and the same Address System Number replaces the previous one. The cache MUST deliver the
Family (see AFI Flags field), replaces the previous one. This is to complete data of an ASPA record in a single ASPA PDU.
avoid a race condition when a BGP announcement is received between a
withdrawn ASPA PDU and a newly announced ASPA PDU. Therefore, the
cache MUST deliver the complete data of an ASPA record in a single
ASPA PDU.
The router should see at most one ASPA for a given AFI from a cache The router MUST see at most one ASPA from a cache for a particular
for a particular Customer Autonomous System Number active at any Customer Autonomous System Number active at any time. As a number of
time. As a number of conditions in the global RPKI may present conditions in the global RPKI may present multiple valid ASPA RPKI
multiple valid ASPA RPKI records for a single customer to a records for a single customer to a particular RP cache, this places a
particular RP cache, this places a burden on the cache to form the burden on the cache to form the union of multiple ASPA records it has
union of multiple ASPA records it has received from the global RPKI received from the global RPKI into one ASPA PDU.
into one ASPA PDU.
The Flags field is as described in Section 5. The Flags field is as described in Section 5.
For the ASPA PDU, the announce/withdraw Flag is set to 1 to indicate For the ASPA PDU, the announce/withdraw Flag is set to 1 to indicate
either the announcement of a new ASPA record or a replacement for a either the announcement of a new ASPA record or a replacement for a
previously announced record with the same Customer Autonomous System previously announced record with the same Customer Autonomous System
Number and AFI. The announce/withdraw flag set to 0 indicates Number.
removal of the ASPA record in total. Here, only the AFI and the
customer AS of the ASPA record MUST be provided, the Provider AS
Count as well as the Provider AS Numbers list MUST be zero.
The AFI Flags field is defined as follows:
Bit Bit Name If the announce/withdraw flag is set to 0, it indicates removal of
---- ------------------- the entire ASPA record for that Customer AS. Here, the customer AS
0 AFI (IPv4 == 0, IPv6 == 1) of the ASPA record MUST be provided, the Provider AS Count must be
1-7 Reserved, MUST be zero zero, the Provider AS Numbers list MUST be null, and these last two
fields MUST be ignored by the router.
The Provider AS Count is the number of 32-bit Provider Autonomous The Provider AS Count is the number of 32-bit Provider Autonomous
System Numbers in the PDU. System Numbers in the PDU.
The Customer Autonomous System Number is the 32-bit Autonomous System The Customer Autonomous System Number is the 32-bit Autonomous System
Number of the customer which authenticated the PDU. There MUST be Number of the customer which authenticated the ASPA RPKI data. There
one and only one ASPA for a Customer Autonomous System Number active MUST be one and only one ASPA for a Customer Autonomous System Number
in the router at any time. active in the router at any time.
There are zero or more 32-bit Provider Autonomous System Number There are zero or more 32-bit Provider Autonomous System Number
fields as indicated in the Provider AS Count; see fields as indicated in the Provider AS Count; see
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]. [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile].
Receipt of an ASPA PDU with the Flags field indicating Delete is an
explicit withdraw from the router of the entire ASPA data for that
customer AS. While the Provider AS Count and the Provider AS Numbers
MUST be ignored by the router when the Flags field indicates a
Delete, the cache MUST set the Provider AS Count to zero, and have a
null Provider AS Numbers list.
6. Protocol Timing Parameters 6. Protocol Timing Parameters
Since the data the cache distributes via the RPKI-Router protocol are Since the data the cache distributes via the RPKI-Router protocol are
retrieved from the Global RPKI system at intervals which are only retrieved from the Global RPKI system at intervals which are only
known to the cache, only the cache can really know how frequently it known to the cache, only the cache can really know how frequently it
makes sense for the router to poll the cache, or how long the data makes sense for the router to poll the cache, or how long the data
are likely to remain valid (or, at least, unchanged). For this are likely to remain valid (or, at least, unchanged). For this
reason, as well as to allow the cache some control over the load reason, as well as to allow the cache some control over the load
placed on it by its client routers, the End Of Data PDU includes placed on it by its client routers, the End Of Data PDU includes
three values that allow the cache to communicate timing parameters to three values that allow the cache to communicate timing parameters to
skipping to change at page 21, line 49 skipping to change at page 21, line 34
Minimum allowed value: 600 seconds (10 minutes). Minimum allowed value: 600 seconds (10 minutes).
Maximum allowed value: 172800 seconds (2 days). Maximum allowed value: 172800 seconds (2 days).
Recommended default: 7200 seconds (2 hours). Recommended default: 7200 seconds (2 hours).
If the router has never issued a successful query against a If the router has never issued a successful query against a
particular cache, it SHOULD retry periodically using the default particular cache, it SHOULD retry periodically using the default
Retry Interval, above. Retry Interval, above.
Caches MUST set Expire Interval to a value larger than either Refresh Caches MUST set Expire Interval to a value larger than both the
Interval or Retry Interval. Refresh Interval and the Retry Interval.
7. Protocol Version Negotiation 7. Protocol Version Negotiation
A router MUST start each transport connection by issuing either a Once a router has established a transport connection to a cache, it
Reset Query or a Serial Query. This query MUST tell the cache the MUST attempt to open a RPKI-Router 'session' by issuing either a
highest version of this protocol the router implements. Reset Query Section 5.4) or a Serial Query (Section 5.3) with the
highest version of this protocol the router implements in the
Protocol Version field. If the cache supports that version, it
responds with a Cache Response (Section 5.5) of that version and the
session is considered open.
If a cache which supports version N receives a query from a router If a cache which supports version C receives a query with Protocol
which specifies its highest supported version Q < N, the cache MUST Version Q < C, and the cache does not support versions <= Q, the
downgrade to protocol version Q [RFC6810] or [RFC8210] or send a cache MUST send an Error Report (Section 5.11) with Protocol Version
version 2 Error Report PDU with Error Code 4 ("Unsupported Protocol C and Error Code 4 ("Unsupported Protocol Version") and disconnect
Version") and terminate the connection; in which case the Arbitrary the transport, as negotiation is hopeless.
Text field of the ERROR Report PDU MUST be a list of one octet binary
integers indicating the version numbers the cache supports. The
router MUST choose the highest mutally supported version. If there
are none, the router MUST abort the session, sending a version 2
Error Report PDU with Error Code 4 ("Unsupported Protocol Version").
If a router which supports version N sends a query to a cache which If a cache which supports version C receives a query with Protocol
only supports version C < N, one of two things will happen: Version Q < C, and the cache can support version Q, the cache MUST
downgrade to protocol version Q, [RFC6810] or [RFC8210], and respond
with a Cache Response (Section 5.5) of that Protocol Version, Q, and
the RPKI-Rtr session is considered open.
1. The cache may terminate the connection, perhaps with a version 2 If the the cache which supports C as its highest verion receives a
Error Report PDU with Error Code 4 ("Unsupported Protocol query of version Q > C, the cache MUST send an Error Report with
Version"). In this case, the router MAY retry the connection Protocol Version C and Error Code 4. The router SHOULD send another
using protocol version C. query with a Protocol Version Q with Q == the version C in the Error
Report; unless it has already failed at that version, which indicates
a fatal error in programming of the cache which SHOULD result in
transport termination.
2. The cache may reply with a version C response. In this case, the If the router requests Q == 0 and it still fails with the cache
router MUST either downgrade to version C or terminate the responding with an Error Report with Error Code 4, then the router
connection. MUST abort the transport connection, as negotiation is hopeless.
In any of the downgraded combinations above, the new features of the In any of the downgraded combinations above, the new features of the
higher version will not be available, and all PDUs will have the higher version will not be available, and all PDUs MUST have the
negotiated lower version number in their version fields. negotiated lower version number in their version fields.
If either party receives a PDU containing an unrecognized Protocol If either party receives a PDU containing an unrecognized Protocol
Version (neither 0, 1, nor 2) during this negotiation, it MUST either Version (neither 0, 1, nor 2) during this negotiation, it MUST either
downgrade to a known version or terminate the connection, with an downgrade to a known version or terminate the connection, with an
Error Report PDU unless the received PDU is itself an Error Report Error Report PDU unless the received PDU is itself an Error Report
PDU. PDU.
The router MUST ignore any Serial Notify PDUs it might receive from The router MUST ignore any Serial Notify PDUs it might receive from
the cache during this initial startup period, regardless of the the cache during this initial startup period, regardless of the
skipping to change at page 23, line 23 skipping to change at page 23, line 6
of the not-yet-complete version negotiation process, so there is of the not-yet-complete version negotiation process, so there is
nothing to be gained by processing notifications until version nothing to be gained by processing notifications until version
negotiation completes. negotiation completes.
Caches SHOULD NOT send Serial Notify PDUs before version negotiation Caches SHOULD NOT send Serial Notify PDUs before version negotiation
completes. Routers, however, MUST handle such notifications (by completes. Routers, however, MUST handle such notifications (by
ignoring them) for backwards compatibility with caches serving ignoring them) for backwards compatibility with caches serving
protocol version 0. protocol version 0.
Once the cache and router have agreed upon a Protocol Version via the Once the cache and router have agreed upon a Protocol Version via the
negotiation process above, that version is stable for the life of the negotiation process above, that version is fixed for the life of the
session. See Section 5.1 for a discussion of the interaction between session. See Section 5.1 for a discussion of the interaction between
Protocol Version and Session ID. Protocol Version and Session ID.
The configured transport security, the negotiated RPKI-Rtr version,
etc. MAY NOT be changed once a session has been established. If one
side or the other wishes to try a different transport, protocol
version, etc. they MUST terminate the transport and restart the
entire transport and version negotiation process.
If either party receives a PDU for a different Protocol Version once If either party receives a PDU for a different Protocol Version once
the above negotiation completes, that party MUST drop the session; the above negotiation completes, that party MUST drop the session;
unless the PDU containing the unexpected Protocol Version was itself unless the PDU containing the unexpected Protocol Version was itself
an Error Report PDU, the party dropping the session SHOULD send an an Error Report PDU, the party dropping the session SHOULD send an
Error Report with an error code of 8 ("Unexpected Protocol Version"). Error Report with an error code of 8 ("Unexpected Protocol Version").
8. Protocol Sequences 8. Protocol Sequences
The sequences of PDU transmissions fall into four conversations as The sequences of PDU transmissions fall into four conversations as
follows: follows:
skipping to change at page 24, line 7 skipping to change at page 23, line 43
| ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request
| ------- Payload PDU ------> | C sends zero or more | ------- Payload PDU ------> | C sends zero or more
| ------- Payload PDU ------> | IPv4 Prefix, IPv6 Prefix, | ------- Payload PDU ------> | IPv4 Prefix, IPv6 Prefix,
| ------- Payload PDU ------> | ASPA, or Router Key PDUs | ------- Payload PDU ------> | ASPA, or Router Key PDUs
| ------- End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data | ------- End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data
| | and sends new serial | | and sends new serial
~ ~ ~ ~
When a transport connection is first established, the router MUST When a transport connection is first established, the router MUST
send either a Reset Query or a Serial Query. A Serial Query would be send either a Reset Query or a Serial Query. A Serial Query would be
appropriate if the router has significant unexpired data from a appropriate if the router has unexpired data from a broken session
broken session with the same cache and remembers the Session ID of with the same cache and remembers the Session ID of that session, in
that session, in which case a Serial Query containing the Session ID which case a Serial Query containing the Session ID from the previous
from the previous session will allow the router to bring itself up to session will allow the router to bring itself up to date while
date while ensuring that the Serial Numbers are commensurate and that ensuring that the Serial Numbers are commensurate and that the router
the router and cache are speaking compatible versions of the and cache are speaking compatible versions of the protocol. In all
protocol. In all other cases, the router lacks the necessary data other cases, the router lacks the necessary data for fast
for fast resynchronization and therefore MUST fall back to a Reset resynchronization and therefore MUST fall back to a Reset Query.
Query.
The Reset Query sequence is also used when the router receives a The Reset Query sequence is also used when the router receives a
Cache Reset, chooses a new cache, or fears that it has otherwise lost Cache Reset, chooses a new cache, or fears that it has otherwise lost
its way. its way.
See Section 7 for details on version negotiation. See Section 7 for details on version negotiation.
To limit the length of time a cache must keep the data necessary to To limit the length of time a cache must keep the data necessary to
generate incremental updates, a router MUST send either a Serial generate incremental updates, a router MUST send either a Serial
Query or a Reset Query periodically. This also acts as a keep-alive Query or a Reset Query periodically. This also acts as a keep-alive
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to a restart, and has not yet recovered. While it is possible that a to a restart, and has not yet recovered. While it is possible that a
cache might go into such a state without dropping any of its active cache might go into such a state without dropping any of its active
sessions, a router is more likely to see this behavior when it sessions, a router is more likely to see this behavior when it
initially connects and issues a Reset Query while the cache is still initially connects and issues a Reset Query while the cache is still
rebuilding its database. rebuilding its database.
When a router receives this kind of error, the router SHOULD attempt When a router receives this kind of error, the router SHOULD attempt
to connect to any other caches in its cache list, in preference to connect to any other caches in its cache list, in preference
order. If no other caches are available, the router MUST issue order. If no other caches are available, the router MUST issue
periodic Reset Queries until it gets a new usable load from the periodic Reset Queries until it gets a new usable load from the
cache. cache; maybe once a minute so as not to DoS the cache.
9. Transport 9. Transport
The transport-layer session between a router and a cache carries the The transport-layer session between a router and a cache carries the
binary PDUs in a persistent session. binary PDUs in a persistent session.
To prevent cache spoofing and DoS attacks by illegitimate routers, it To prevent cache spoofing and DoS attacks by illegitimate routers, it
is highly desirable that the router and the cache be authenticated to is highly desirable that the router and the cache be authenticated to
each other. Integrity protection for payloads is also desirable to each other. Integrity protection for payloads is also desirable to
protect against monkey-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Unfortunately, protect against monkey-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Unfortunately,
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If available to the operator, caches and routers MUST use one of the If available to the operator, caches and routers MUST use one of the
following more protected protocols: following more protected protocols:
* Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO transport [RFC5925] over the * Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO transport [RFC5925] over the
rpki-rtr port. rpki-rtr port.
* Caches and routers MAY use Secure Shell version 2 (SSHv2) * Caches and routers MAY use Secure Shell version 2 (SSHv2)
transport [RFC4252] using the normal SSH port. For an example, transport [RFC4252] using the normal SSH port. For an example,
see Section 9.1. see Section 9.1.
* Caches and routers MAY use TCP MD5 transport [RFC5925] using the * Caches and routers MAY use TCP MD5 transport [RFC2385] using the
rpki-rtr port. Note that TCP MD5 has been obsoleted by TCP-AO rpki-rtr port if no other protected transport is available. Note
[RFC5925]. that TCP MD5 has been obsoleted by TCP-AO [RFC5925].
* Caches and routers MAY use TCP over IPsec transport [RFC4301] * Caches and routers MAY use TCP over IPsec transport [RFC4301]
using the rpki-rtr port. using the rpki-rtr port.
* Caches and routers MAY use Transport Layer Security (TLS) * Caches and routers MAY use Transport Layer Security (TLS)
transport [RFC8446] using port rpki-rtr-tls (324); see Section 15. transport [RFC8446] using port rpki-rtr-tls (324); see Section 15.
Conformance to [RFC7525] modern cipher suites is REQUIRED.
9.1. SSH Transport 9.1. SSH Transport
To run over SSH, the client router first establishes an SSH transport To run over SSH, the client router first establishes an SSH transport
connection using the SSHv2 transport protocol, and the client and connection using the SSHv2 transport protocol, and the client and
server exchange keys for message integrity and encryption. The server exchange keys for message integrity and encryption. The
client then invokes the "ssh-userauth" service to authenticate the client then invokes the "ssh-userauth" service to authenticate the
application, as described in the SSH authentication protocol application, as described in the SSH authentication protocol
[RFC4252]. Once the application has been successfully authenticated, [RFC4252]. Once the application has been successfully authenticated,
the client invokes the "ssh-connection" service, also known as the the client invokes the "ssh-connection" service, also known as the
skipping to change at page 28, line 10 skipping to change at page 28, line 7
Subsystem support is a feature of SSHv2 and is not included in SSHv1. Subsystem support is a feature of SSHv2 and is not included in SSHv1.
Running this protocol as an SSH subsystem avoids the need for the Running this protocol as an SSH subsystem avoids the need for the
application to recognize shell prompts or skip over extraneous application to recognize shell prompts or skip over extraneous
information, such as a system message that is sent at shell startup. information, such as a system message that is sent at shell startup.
It is assumed that the router and cache have exchanged keys out of It is assumed that the router and cache have exchanged keys out of
band by some reasonably secured means. band by some reasonably secured means.
Cache servers supporting SSH transport MUST accept RSA authentication Cache servers supporting SSH transport MUST accept RSA authentication
and SHOULD accept Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and SHOULD accept Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
authentication. User authentication MUST be supported; host authentication. User authentication "publickey") MUST be supported;
authentication MAY be supported. Implementations MAY support host authentication "hostbased") MAY be supported. Implementations
password authentication. Client routers SHOULD verify the public key MAY support password authentication "password"). "None"
of the cache to avoid MITM attacks. authentication MUST NOT be used. Client routers SHOULD verify the
public key of the cache to avoid MITM attacks.
9.2. TLS Transport 9.2. TLS Transport
Client routers using TLS transport MUST present client-side Client routers using TLS transport MUST present client-side
certificates to authenticate themselves to the cache in order to certificates to authenticate themselves to the cache in order to
allow the cache to manage the load by rejecting connections from allow the cache to manage the load by rejecting connections from
unauthorized routers. In principle, any type of certificate and unauthorized routers. In principle, any type of certificate and
Certification Authority (CA) may be used; however, in general, cache Certification Authority (CA) may be used; however, in general, cache
operators will wish to create their own small-scale CA and issue operators will wish to create their own small-scale CA and issue
certificates to each authorized router. This simplifies credential certificates to each authorized router. This simplifies credential
skipping to change at page 29, line 5 skipping to change at page 29, line 5
present in rpki-rtr server certificates. present in rpki-rtr server certificates.
* DNS names in rpki-rtr server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the * DNS names in rpki-rtr server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the
wildcard character "*". wildcard character "*".
* rpki-rtr implementations which use TLS MUST NOT use Common Name * rpki-rtr implementations which use TLS MUST NOT use Common Name
(CN-ID) identifiers; a CN field may be present in the server (CN-ID) identifiers; a CN field may be present in the server
certificate's subject name but MUST NOT be used for authentication certificate's subject name but MUST NOT be used for authentication
within the rules described in [RFC6125]. within the rules described in [RFC6125].
* The client router MUST set its "reference identifier" to the DNS * The client router MUST set its "reference identifier" (see
name of the rpki-rtr cache. Section 6.2 of [RFC6125]) to the DNS name of the rpki-rtr cache.
9.3. TCP MD5 Transport 9.3. TCP MD5 Transport
If TCP MD5 is used, implementations MUST support key lengths of at If TCP MD5 is used, implementations MUST support key lengths of at
least 80 printable ASCII bytes, per Section 4.5 of [RFC5925]. least 80 printable ASCII bytes, per Section 4.5 of [RFC2385].
Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences of at least Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences of at least
32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits.
Key rollover with TCP MD5 is problematic. Cache servers SHOULD Key rollover with TCP MD5 is problematic. Cache servers SHOULD
support [RFC4808]. support [RFC4808].
9.4. TCP-AO Transport 9.4. TCP-AO Transport
Implementations MUST support key lengths of at least 80 printable Implementations MUST support key lengths of at least 80 printable
ASCII bytes. Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences ASCII bytes. Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences
skipping to change at page 29, line 38 skipping to change at page 29, line 38
10. Router-Cache Setup 10. Router-Cache Setup
A cache has the public authentication data for each router it is A cache has the public authentication data for each router it is
configured to support. configured to support.
A router may be configured to peer with a selection of caches, and a A router may be configured to peer with a selection of caches, and a
cache may be configured to support a selection of routers. Each must cache may be configured to support a selection of routers. Each must
have the name of, and authentication data for, each peer. In have the name of, and authentication data for, each peer. In
addition, in a router, this list has a non-unique preference value addition, in a router, this list has a non-unique preference value
for each server. This preference merely denotes proximity, not for each cache. This preference is intended to be based on
trust, preferred belief, et cetera. The client router attempts to proximity, a la RTT, not trust, preferred belief, et cetera. The
establish a session with each potential serving cache in preference client router attempts to establish a session with each potential
order and then starts to load data from the most preferred cache to serving cache in preference order and then starts to load data from
which it can connect and authenticate. The router's list of caches the most preferred cache to which it can connect and authenticate.
has the following elements: The router's list of caches has the following elements:
Preference: An unsigned integer denoting the router's preference to Preference: An unsigned integer denoting the router's preference to
connect to that cache; the lower the value, the more preferred. connect to that cache; the lower the value, the more preferred.
Name: The IP address or fully qualified domain name of the cache. Name: The IP address or fully qualified domain name of the cache.
Cache Credential(s): Any credential (such as a public key) needed to Cache Credential(s): Any credential (such as a public key) needed to
authenticate the cache's identity to the router. authenticate the cache's identity to the router.
Router Credential(s): Any credential (such as a private key or Router Credential(s): Any credential (such as a private key or
skipping to change at page 30, line 43 skipping to change at page 30, line 43
to refresh from a particular cache. to refresh from a particular cache.
If a client loses connectivity to a cache it is using or otherwise If a client loses connectivity to a cache it is using or otherwise
decides to switch to a new cache, it SHOULD retain the data from the decides to switch to a new cache, it SHOULD retain the data from the
previous cache until it has a full set of data from one or more other previous cache until it has a full set of data from one or more other
caches. Note that this may already be true at the point of caches. Note that this may already be true at the point of
connection loss if the client has connections to more than one cache. connection loss if the client has connections to more than one cache.
11. ROA PDU Race Minimization 11. ROA PDU Race Minimization
When a cache is sending ROA PDUs to a router, especially an initial When a cache is sending ROA (IPv4 or IPv6) PDUs to a router,
full load in response to a Reset Query PDU, two undesirable race especially an initial full load in response to a Reset Query PDU, two
conditions are possible: undesirable race conditions are possible:
Break Before Make: For some prefix P, an AS may announce two (or Break Before Make: For some prefix P, an AS may announce two (or
more) ROAs because they are in the process of changing what more) ROAs because they are in the process of changing what
provider AS is announcing P. This is a case of "make before provider AS is announcing P. This is a case of "make before
break." If a cache is feeding a router and sends the one not yet break." If a cache is feeding a router and sends the one not yet
in service a significant time before sending the one currently in in service a significant time before sending the one currently in
service, then BGP data could be marked invalid during the service, then BGP data could be marked invalid during the
interval. To minimize that interval, the cache SHOULD announce interval. To minimize that interval, the cache SHOULD announce
all ROAs for the same prefix as close to sequentially as possible. all ROAs for the same prefix as close to sequentially as possible.
skipping to change at page 32, line 6 skipping to change at page 32, line 6
Experience with large DNS cache deployments has shown that complex Experience with large DNS cache deployments has shown that complex
topologies are ill-advised, as it is easy to make errors in the topologies are ill-advised, as it is easy to make errors in the
graph, e.g., not maintain a loop-free condition. graph, e.g., not maintain a loop-free condition.
Of course, these are illustrations, and there are other possible Of course, these are illustrations, and there are other possible
deployment strategies. It is expected that minimizing load on the deployment strategies. It is expected that minimizing load on the
Global RPKI servers will be a major consideration. Global RPKI servers will be a major consideration.
To keep load on Global RPKI services from unnecessary peaks, it is To keep load on Global RPKI services from unnecessary peaks, it is
recommended that primary caches which load from the distributed recommended that caches which fetch from the Global RPKI not do so
Global RPKI not do so all at the same times, e.g., on the hour. all at the same times, e.g., on the hour. Choose a random time,
Choose a random time, perhaps the ISP's AS number modulo 60, and perhaps the ISP's AS number modulo 60, and jitter the inter-fetch
jitter the inter-fetch timing. timing.
13. Error Codes 13. Error Codes
This section describes the meaning of the error codes. There is an This section describes the meaning of the error codes. There is an
IANA registry where valid error codes are listed; see [iana-err]. IANA registry where valid error codes are listed; see [iana-err].
Errors which are considered fatal MUST cause the session to be Errors which are considered fatal MUST cause the session to be
dropped. dropped, and the router MUST flush all data learned from that cache.
0: Corrupt Data (fatal): The receiver believes the received PDU to 0: Corrupt Data (fatal): The receiver believes the received PDU to
be corrupt in a manner not specified by another error code. be corrupt in a manner not specified by another error code.
1: Internal Error (fatal): The party reporting the error experienced 1: Internal Error (fatal): The party reporting the error experienced
some kind of internal error unrelated to protocol operation (ran some kind of internal error unrelated to protocol operation (ran
out of memory, a coding assertion failed, et cetera). out of memory, a coding assertion failed, et cetera).
2: No Data Available: The cache believes itself to be in good 2: No Data Available: The cache believes itself to be in good
working order but is unable to answer either a Serial Query or a working order but is unable to answer either a Serial Query or a
Reset Query because it has no useful data available at this time. Reset Query because it has no useful data available at this time.
This is likely to be a temporary error and most likely indicates This is likely to be a temporary error and most likely indicates
that the cache has not yet completed pulling down an initial that the cache has not yet completed pulling down an initial
current data set from the Global RPKI system after some kind of current data set from the Global RPKI system after some kind of
event that invalidated whatever data it might have previously held event that invalidated whatever data it might have previously held
(reboot, network partition, et cetera). (reboot, network partition, et cetera).
3: Invalid Request (fatal): The cache server believes the client's 3: Invalid Request (fatal): The cache server believes the client's
request to be invalid. request to be invalid.
4: Unsupported Protocol Version (fatal): The Protocol Version is not 4: Unsupported Protocol Version (non-fatal): The Protocol Version is
known by the receiver of the PDU. not known by the receiver of the PDU. A session is not
[re-]established, but data previously learned need not be flushed.
5: Unsupported PDU Type (fatal): The PDU Type is not known by the 5: Unsupported PDU Type (fatal): The PDU Type is not known by the
receiver of the PDU. receiver of the PDU.
6: Withdrawal of Unknown Record (fatal): The received PDU has 6: Withdrawal of Unknown Record (fatal): The received PDU has
Flag=0, but a matching record ({Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple Flag=0, but a matching record ({Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple
for an IPvX PDU, or {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} tuple for a for an IPvX PDU, or {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} tuple for a
Router Key PDU), or Customer Autonomous System for an ASPA PDU Router Key PDU), or Customer Autonomous System for an ASPA PDU
does not exist in the receiver's database. does not exist in the receiver's database.
skipping to change at page 33, line 20 skipping to change at page 33, line 20
Protocol Version field that differs from the protocol version Protocol Version field that differs from the protocol version
negotiated in Section 7. negotiated in Section 7.
14. Security Considerations 14. Security Considerations
As this document describes a security protocol, many aspects of As this document describes a security protocol, many aspects of
security interest are described in the relevant sections. This security interest are described in the relevant sections. This
section points out issues which may not be obvious in other sections. section points out issues which may not be obvious in other sections.
Cache Validation: In order for a collection of caches as described Cache Validation: In order for a collection of caches as described
in Section 12 to guarantee a consistent view, they need to be in Section 12 to provide a consistent view, they need to be given
given consistent trust anchors to use in their internal validation consistent trust anchors of the Certification Authorities to use
process. Distribution of a consistent trust anchor is assumed to in their internal validation process. Distribution of a
be out of band. consistent trust anchor set to validating caches is assumed to be
out of band.
Cache Peer Identification: The router initiates a transport Cache Peer Identification: The router initiates a transport
connection to a cache, which it identifies by either IP address or connection to a cache, which it identifies by either IP address or
fully qualified domain name. Be aware that a DNS or address fully qualified domain name. Be aware that a DNS or address
spoofing attack could make the correct cache unreachable. No spoofing attack could make the correct cache unreachable. No
session would be established, as the authorization keys would not session would be established, as the authorization keys would not
match. match.
Transport Security: The RPKI relies on object, not server or Transport Security: The RPKI relies on object, not server or
transport, trust. That is, the IANA root trust anchor is transport, trust. That is, the IANA root trust anchor is
distributed to all caches through some out-of-band means and can distributed to all caches through some out-of-band means and can
then be used by each cache to validate certificates and ROAs all then be used by each cache to validate certificates and ROAs all
the way down the tree. The inter-cache relationships are based on the way down the tree. The inter-cache relationships are based on
this object security model; hence, the inter-cache transport can this object security model; hence, the inter-cache transport can
be lightly protected. be lightly protected.
However, this protocol document assumes that the routers cannot do However, this protocol document assumes that the routers cannot do
the validation cryptography. Hence, the last link, from cache to the validation cryptography. Hence, the last link, from cache to
router, is secured by server authentication and transport-level router, SHOULD be secured by server authentication and transport-
security. This is dangerous, as server authentication and level security to prevent monkey in the middle attacks; though it
transport have very different threat models than object security. might not be. Not using transport security is dangerous, as
server authentication and transport have very different threat
models than object security.
So the strength of the trust relationship and the transport So the strength of the trust relationship and the transport
between the router(s) and the cache(s) are critical. You're between the router(s) and the cache(s) are critical. You're
betting your routing on this. betting your routing on this.
While we cannot say the cache must be on the same LAN, if only due While we cannot say the cache must be on the same LAN, if only due
to the issue of an enterprise wanting to offload the cache task to to the issue of an enterprise wanting to offload the cache task to
their upstream ISP(s), locality, trust, and control are very their upstream ISP(s), locality, trust, and control are very
critical issues here. The cache(s) really SHOULD be as close, in critical issues here. The cache(s) really SHOULD be as close, in
the sense of controlled and protected (against DDoS, MITM) the sense of controlled and protected (against DDoS, MITM)
transport, to the router(s) as possible. It also SHOULD be transport, to the router(s) as possible. It also SHOULD be
topologically close so that a minimum of validated routing data topologically close so that a minimum of validated routing data
are needed to bootstrap a router's access to a cache. are needed to bootstrap a router's access to a cache.
The identity of the cache server SHOULD be verified and Authenticating transport protocols (i.e. not raw TCP) will
authenticated by the router client, and vice versa, before any authenticate the identity of the cache server to the router
data are exchanged. client, and vice versa, before any data are exchanged.
Transports which cannot provide the necessary authentication and Transports which cannot provide the necessary authentication and
integrity (see Section 9) must rely on network design and integrity (see Section 9) must rely on network design and
operational controls to provide protection against spoofing/ operational controls to provide protection against spoofing/
corruption attacks. As pointed out in Section 9, TCP-AO is the corruption attacks. As pointed out in Section 9, TCP-AO is the
long-term plan. Protocols which provide integrity and long-term plan. Protocols which provide integrity and
authenticity SHOULD be used, and if they cannot, i.e., TCP is used authenticity SHOULD be used, and if they cannot, i.e., TCP is used
as the transport, the router and cache MUST be on the same as the transport, the router and cache MUST be on the same
trusted, controlled network. trusted, controlled network.
skipping to change at page 34, line 36 skipping to change at page 34, line 38
This section only discusses updates required in the existing IANA This section only discusses updates required in the existing IANA
protocol registries to accommodate version 2 of this protocol. See protocol registries to accommodate version 2 of this protocol. See
[RFC8210] for IANA considerations of the previous (version 1) [RFC8210] for IANA considerations of the previous (version 1)
protocol. protocol.
All of the PDU types in the IANA "rpki-rtr-pdu" registry [iana-pdu] All of the PDU types in the IANA "rpki-rtr-pdu" registry [iana-pdu]
in protocol versions 0 and 1 are also allowed in protocol version 2, in protocol versions 0 and 1 are also allowed in protocol version 2,
with the addition of the new ASPA PDU. with the addition of the new ASPA PDU.
The policy for adding to the registry is RFC Required per [RFC8126];
the document must be either Standards Track or Experimental.
The "rpki-rtr-pdu" registry [iana-pdu] has been updated as follows: The "rpki-rtr-pdu" registry [iana-pdu] has been updated as follows:
Protocol PDU Protocol PDU
Version Type Description Version Type Description
-------- ---- --------------- -------- ---- ---------------
0-2 0 Serial Notify 0-2 0 Serial Notify
0-2 1 Serial Query 0-2 1 Serial Query
0-2 2 Reset Query 0-2 2 Reset Query
0-2 3 Cache Response 0-2 3 Cache Response
0-2 4 IPv4 Prefix 0-2 4 IPv4 Prefix
0-2 6 IPv6 Prefix 0-2 6 IPv6 Prefix
0-2 7 End of Data 0-2 7 End of Data
0-2 8 Cache Reset 0-2 8 Cache Reset
0 9 Reserved 0 9 Reserved
1-2 9 Router Key 1-2 9 Router Key
0-2 10 Error Report 0-2 10 Error Report
0-1 11 Reserved 0-1 11 Reserved
2 11 ASPA 2 11 ASPA
0-2 255 Reserved 0-2 255 Reserved
All previous entries in the IANA "rpki-rtr-error" registry [iana-err]
remain valid for all protocol versions. Protocol version 1 added one
new error code:
Error
Code Description
----- ---------------------------
8 Unexpected Protocol Version
16. References 16. References
16.1. Normative References 16.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile] [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]
Azimov, A., Uskov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., Snijders, J., Azimov, A., Uskov, E., Bush, R., Snijders, J., Housley,
and R. Housley, "A Profile for Autonomous System Provider R., and B. Maddison, "A Profile for Autonomous System
Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- Provider Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-07, 31 January 2022, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-18, 25 June 2024,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
profile-07.txt>. aspa-profile-18>.
[iana-err] IANA, "rpki-rtr-error", [iana-err] IANA, "rpki-rtr-error",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki#rpki-rtr-error>. <https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki#rpki-rtr-error>.
[iana-pdu] IANA, "rpki-rtr-pdu", [iana-pdu] IANA, "rpki-rtr-pdu",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki#rpki-rtr-pdu>. <https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki#rpki-rtr-pdu>.
[RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982, [RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1982, August 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC1982, August 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1982>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1982>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5
Signature Option", RFC 2385, DOI 10.17487/RFC2385, August
1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2385>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>. 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, DOI 10.17487/RFC4252, Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, DOI 10.17487/RFC4252,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4252>. January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4252>.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301, Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
skipping to change at page 37, line 10 skipping to change at page 37, line 5
[RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810, Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>. (DTLS)", RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key [RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1", Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017, RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8608] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key [RFC8608] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8608, Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8608,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8608, June 2019, DOI 10.17487/RFC8608, June 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8608>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8608>.
[RFC8635] Bush, R., Turner, S., and K. Patel, "Router Keying for
BGPsec", RFC 8635, DOI 10.17487/RFC8635, August 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8635>.
16.2. Informative References 16.2. Informative References
[RFC1996] Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone [RFC1996] Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone
Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC1996, Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC1996,
August 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1996>. August 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1996>.
[RFC4808] Bellovin, S., "Key Change Strategies for TCP-MD5", [RFC4808] Bellovin, S., "Key Change Strategies for TCP-MD5",
RFC 4808, DOI 10.17487/RFC4808, March 2007, RFC 4808, DOI 10.17487/RFC4808, March 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4808>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4808>.
skipping to change at page 38, line 13 skipping to change at page 38, line 13
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>. February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Nils Bars, Steve Bellovin, Oliver Borchert, The authors wish to thank Nils Bars, Steve Bellovin, Oliver Borchert,
Mohamed Boucadair, Tim Bruijnzeels, Rex Fernando, Richard Hansen, Mohamed Boucadair, Tim Bruijnzeels, Roman Danyliw, Rex Fernando,
Martin Hoffmann, Paul Hoffman, Fabian Holler, Russ Housley, Pradosh Richard Hansen, Martin Hoffmann, Paul Hoffman, Fabian Holler, Russ
Mohapatra, Keyur Patel, David Mandelberg, Sandy Murphy, Robert Housley, Pradosh Mohapatra, Keyur Patel, David Mandelberg, Sandy
Raszuk, Andreas Reuter, Thomas Schmidt, John Scudder, Ruediger Volk, Murphy, Robert Raszuk, Andreas Reuter, Thomas Schmidt, John Scudder,
Matthias Waehlisch, and David Ward. Particular thanks go to Hannes Ruediger Volk, Matthias Waehlisch, and David Ward. Particular thanks
Gredler for showing us the dangers of unnecessary fields. go to Hannes Gredler for showing us the dangers of unnecessary
fields.
No doubt this list is incomplete. We apologize to any contributor No doubt this list is incomplete. We apologize to any contributor
whose name we missed. whose name we missed.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Randy Bush Randy Bush
IIJ, Arrcus, & DRL IIJ Research, Arrcus, & DRL
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
United States of America United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
Rob Austein Rob Austein
Dragon Research Labs Dragon Research Labs
Email: sra@hactrn.net Email: sra@hactrn.net
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