CWE-1385: Missing Origin Validation in WebSocketsWeakness ID: 1385 Vulnerability Mapping:
ALLOWEDThis CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities Abstraction: VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. |
Description The product uses a WebSocket, but it does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid. Extended Description WebSockets provide a bi-directional low latency communication (near real-time) between a client and a server. WebSockets are different than HTTP in that the connections are long-lived, as the channel will remain open until the client or the server is ready to send the message, whereas in HTTP, once the response occurs (which typically happens immediately), the transaction completes. A WebSocket can leverage the existing HTTP protocol over ports 80 and 443, but it is not limited to HTTP. WebSockets can make cross-origin requests that are not restricted by browser-based protection mechanisms such as the Same Origin Policy (SOP) or Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS). Without explicit origin validation, this makes CSRF attacks more powerful. Alternate Terms
Cross-Site WebSocket hijacking (CSWSH): | this term is used for attacks that exploit this weakness |
Common Consequences This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
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Confidentiality Integrity Availability Non-Repudiation Access Control
| Technical Impact: Varies by Context; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Read Application Data; Modify Application Data; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart The consequences will vary depending on the nature of the functionality that is vulnerable to CSRF. An attacker could effectively perform any operations as the victim. If the victim is an administrator or privileged user, the consequences may include obtaining complete control over the web application - deleting or stealing data, uninstalling the product, or using it to launch other attacks against all of the product's users. Because the attacker has the identity of the victim, the scope of the CSRF is limited only by the victim's privileges. | |
Potential Mitigations
Phase: Implementation Enable CORS-like access restrictions by verifying the 'Origin' header during the WebSocket handshake. |
Phase: Implementation Use a randomized CSRF token to verify requests. |
Phase: Implementation Use TLS to securely communicate using 'wss' (WebSocket Secure) instead of 'ws'. |
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation Require user authentication prior to the WebSocket connection being established. For example, the WS library in Node has a 'verifyClient' function. |
Phase: Implementation Leverage rate limiting to prevent against DoS. Use of the leaky bucket algorithm can help with this. Effectiveness: Defense in Depth |
Phase: Implementation Use a library that provides restriction of the payload size. For example, WS library for Node includes 'maxPayloadoption' that can be set. Effectiveness: Defense in Depth |
Phase: Implementation Treat data/input as untrusted in both directions and apply the same data/input sanitization as XSS, SQLi, etc. |
Relationships Modes Of Introduction The different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.Phase | Note |
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Architecture and Design | | Implementation | |
Observed Examples Reference | Description |
| web console for SIEM product does not check Origin header, allowing Cross Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWH) |
| Chain: gaming client attempts to validate the Origin header, but only uses a substring, allowing Cross-Site WebSocket hijacking by forcing requests from an origin whose hostname is a substring of the valid origin. |
| WebSocket server does not check the origin of requests, allowing attackers to steal developer's code using a ws://127.0.0.1:3123/ connection. |
| WebSocket server does not check the origin of requests, allowing attackers to steal developer's code using a ws://127.0.0.1/ connection to a randomized port number. |
| WebSocket server does not check the origin of requests, allowing attackers to steal developer's code using a ws://127.0.0.1:8080/ connection. |
Memberships This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources. Vulnerability Mapping Notes Usage: ALLOWED (this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities) | Reason: Acceptable-Use | Rationale: This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities. | Comments: Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction. |
References
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