CWE-311: Missing Encryption of Sensitive DataWeakness ID: 311 Vulnerability Mapping:
DISCOURAGEDThis CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities Abstraction: ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. |
Description The product does not encrypt sensitive or critical information before storage or transmission. Extended Description The lack of proper data encryption passes up the guarantees of confidentiality, integrity, and accountability that properly implemented encryption conveys. Common Consequences This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
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Confidentiality
| Technical Impact: Read Application Data If the application does not use a secure channel, such as SSL, to exchange sensitive information, it is possible for an attacker with access to the network traffic to sniff packets from the connection and uncover the data. This attack is not technically difficult, but does require physical access to some portion of the network over which the sensitive data travels. This access is usually somewhere near where the user is connected to the network (such as a colleague on the company network) but can be anywhere along the path from the user to the end server. | | Confidentiality Integrity
| Technical Impact: Modify Application Data Omitting the use of encryption in any program which transfers data over a network of any kind should be considered on par with delivering the data sent to each user on the local networks of both the sender and receiver. Worse, this omission allows for the injection of data into a stream of communication between two parties -- with no means for the victims to separate valid data from invalid. In this day of widespread network attacks and password collection sniffers, it is an unnecessary risk to omit encryption from the design of any system which might benefit from it. | |
Potential Mitigations
Phase: Requirements Clearly specify which data or resources are valuable enough that they should be protected by encryption. Require that any transmission or storage of this data/resource should use well-vetted encryption algorithms. |
Phase: Architecture and Design Ensure that encryption is properly integrated into the system design, including but not necessarily limited to: Identify the separate needs and contexts for encryption: One-way (i.e., only the user or recipient needs to have the key). This can be achieved using public key cryptography, or other techniques in which the encrypting party (i.e., the product) does not need to have access to a private key. Two-way (i.e., the encryption can be automatically performed on behalf of a user, but the key must be available so that the plaintext can be automatically recoverable by that user). This requires storage of the private key in a format that is recoverable only by the user (or perhaps by the operating system) in a way that cannot be recovered by others.
Using threat modeling or other techniques, assume that data can be compromised through a separate vulnerability or weakness, and determine where encryption will be most effective. Ensure that data that should be private is not being inadvertently exposed using weaknesses such as insecure permissions ( CWE-732). [ REF-7] |
Phase: Architecture and Design Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis. For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification. Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak. Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [ REF-267] |
Phase: Architecture and Design Strategy: Separation of Privilege Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges. |
Phases: Implementation; Architecture and Design When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps ( CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks. |
Phase: Implementation Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction Use naming conventions and strong types to make it easier to spot when sensitive data is being used. When creating structures, objects, or other complex entities, separate the sensitive and non-sensitive data as much as possible. Effectiveness: Defense in Depth Note: This makes it easier to spot places in the code where data is being used that is unencrypted. |
Relationships This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore. Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000) Nature | Type | ID | Name |
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ChildOf | Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. | 693 | Protection Mechanism Failure | ParentOf | Base - a weakness
that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 312 | Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information | ParentOf | Base - a weakness
that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 319 | Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information | PeerOf | Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 327 | Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm |
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore. Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (CWE-1003) Nature | Type | ID | Name |
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MemberOf | View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). | 1003 | Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities | ParentOf | Base - a weakness
that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 312 | Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information | ParentOf | Base - a weakness
that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 319 | Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information |
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore. Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (CWE-1008) Nature | Type | ID | Name |
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MemberOf | Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1013 | Encrypt Data |
Modes Of Introduction The different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.Phase | Note |
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Architecture and Design | OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase. | Operation | |
Likelihood Of Exploit Demonstrative Examples Example 1 This code writes a user's login information to a cookie so the user does not have to login again later. (bad code) Example Language: PHP
function persistLogin($username, $password){ $data = array("username" => $username, "password"=> $password); setcookie ("userdata", $data); }
The code stores the user's username and password in plaintext in a cookie on the user's machine. This exposes the user's login information if their computer is compromised by an attacker. Even if the user's machine is not compromised, this weakness combined with cross-site scripting (CWE-79) could allow an attacker to remotely copy the cookie. Also note this example code also exhibits Plaintext Storage in a Cookie (CWE-315). Example 2 The following code attempts to establish a connection, read in a password, then store it to a buffer. (bad code) Example Language: C
server.sin_family = AF_INET; hp = gethostbyname(argv[1]); if (hp==NULL) error("Unknown host"); memcpy( (char *)&server.sin_addr,(char *)hp->h_addr,hp->h_length); if (argc < 3) port = 80; else port = (unsigned short)atoi(argv[3]); server.sin_port = htons(port); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&server, sizeof server) < 0) error("Connecting"); ... while ((n=read(sock,buffer,BUFSIZE-1))!=-1) {
write(dfd,password_buffer,n); ...
While successful, the program does not encrypt the data before writing it to a buffer, possibly exposing it to unauthorized actors. Example 3 The following code attempts to establish a connection to a site to communicate sensitive information. (bad code) Example Language: Java
try { URL u = new URL("http://www.secret.example.org/"); HttpURLConnection hu = (HttpURLConnection) u.openConnection(); hu.setRequestMethod("PUT"); hu.connect(); OutputStream os = hu.getOutputStream(); hu.disconnect(); } catch (IOException e) { }
Though a connection is successfully made, the connection is unencrypted and it is possible that all sensitive data sent to or received from the server will be read by unintended actors. Observed Examples Reference | Description |
| password and username stored in cleartext in a cookie |
| password stored in cleartext in a file with insecure permissions |
| chat program disables SSL in some circumstances even when the user says to use SSL. |
| Chain: product uses an incorrect public exponent when generating an RSA key, which effectively disables the encryption |
| storage of unencrypted passwords in a database |
| storage of unencrypted passwords in a database |
| product stores a password in cleartext in memory |
| storage of a secret key in cleartext in a temporary file |
| SCADA product uses HTTP Basic Authentication, which is not encrypted |
| login credentials stored unencrypted in a registry key |
| Passwords transmitted in cleartext. |
| Chain: Use of HTTPS cookie without "secure" flag causes it to be transmitted across unencrypted HTTP. |
| Product sends password hash in cleartext in violation of intended policy. |
| Remote management feature sends sensitive information including passwords in cleartext. |
| Backup routine sends password in cleartext in email. |
| Product transmits Blowfish encryption key in cleartext. |
| Printer sends configuration information, including administrative password, in cleartext. |
| Chain: cleartext transmission of the MD5 hash of password enables attacks against a server that is susceptible to replay ( CWE-294). |
| Product sends passwords in cleartext to a log server. |
| Product sends file with cleartext passwords in e-mail message intended for diagnostic purposes. |
Detection Methods
Manual Analysis The characterizaton of sensitive data often requires domain-specific understanding, so manual methods are useful. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. Black box methods may produce artifacts (e.g. stored data or unencrypted network transfer) that require manual evaluation. |
Automated Analysis Automated measurement of the entropy of an input/output source may indicate the use or lack of encryption, but human analysis is still required to distinguish intentionally-unencrypted data (e.g. metadata) from sensitive data. |
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Effectiveness: SOAR Partial |
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Web Application Scanner Web Services Scanner Database Scanners
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial |
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: |
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: |
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Effectiveness: SOAR Partial |
Architecture or Design Review According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.) Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage: |
Memberships This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources. Vulnerability Mapping Notes Usage: DISCOURAGED (this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities) | Reason: Abstraction | Rationale: CWE-311 is high-level with more precise children available. It is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar). | Comments: Consider children CWE-312: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information or CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information. |
Notes Relationship There is an overlapping relationship between insecure storage of sensitive information ( CWE-922) and missing encryption of sensitive information ( CWE-311). Encryption is often used to prevent an attacker from reading the sensitive data. However, encryption does not prevent the attacker from erasing or overwriting the data. Taxonomy Mappings Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
CLASP | | | Failure to encrypt data |
OWASP Top Ten 2007 | A8 | CWE More Specific | Insecure Cryptographic Storage |
OWASP Top Ten 2007 | A9 | CWE More Specific | Insecure Communications |
OWASP Top Ten 2004 | A8 | CWE More Specific | Insecure Storage |
WASC | 4 | | Insufficient Transport Layer Protection |
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) | MSC00-J | | Use SSLSocket rather than Socket for secure data exchange |
Software Fault Patterns | SFP23 | | Exposed Data |
ISA/IEC 62443 | Part 3-3 | | Req SR 4.1 |
ISA/IEC 62443 | Part 3-3 | | Req SR 4.3 |
ISA/IEC 62443 | Part 4-2 | | Req CR 4.1 |
ISA/IEC 62443 | Part 4-2 | | Req CR 7.3 |
ISA/IEC 62443 | Part 4-2 | | Req CR 1.5 |
References
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[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc
and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 17: Failure to Protect Stored Data." Page 253. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
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[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald
and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 2, "Common Vulnerabilities of Encryption", Page 43. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
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Content History Submissions |
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Submission Date | Submitter | Organization |
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2006-07-19 (CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) | CLASP | | | Contributions |
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Contribution Date | Contributor | Organization |
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2023-11-14 (CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) | participants in the CWE ICS/OT SIG 62443 Mapping Fall Workshop | | Contributed or reviewed taxonomy mappings for ISA/IEC 62443 | Modifications |
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Modification Date | Modifier | Organization |
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2008-07-01 | Eric Dalci | Cigital | updated Time_of_Introduction | 2008-08-15 | | Veracode | Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping | 2008-09-08 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings | 2009-10-29 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Other_Notes | 2010-02-16 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Time_of_Introduction | 2010-04-05 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | 2010-06-21 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References | 2010-09-27 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations | 2010-12-13 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns | 2011-03-29 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples | 2011-06-01 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | 2011-06-27 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | 2011-09-13 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | 2012-05-11 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | 2012-10-30 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations, References | 2013-07-17 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationship_Notes | 2014-02-18 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | 2014-06-23 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | 2014-07-30 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | 2015-12-07 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | 2017-01-19 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | 2017-05-03 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | 2017-11-08 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships | 2018-03-27 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Relationships | 2019-01-03 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | 2019-06-20 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type | 2020-02-24 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Relationships | 2020-12-10 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | 2021-10-28 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | 2022-06-28 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | 2023-01-31 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description, Potential_Mitigations | 2023-04-27 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Relationships | 2023-06-29 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships | 2024-02-29 (CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) | CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Taxonomy_Mappings | Previous Entry Names |
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Change Date | Previous Entry Name |
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2008-04-11 | Failure to Encrypt Data | | 2010-02-16 | Failure to Encrypt Sensitive Data | |
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