CWE-839: Numeric Range Comparison Without Minimum CheckWeakness ID: 839 Vulnerability Mapping:
ALLOWEDThis CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities Abstraction: BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. |
Description The product checks a value to ensure that it is less than or equal to a maximum, but it does not also verify that the value is greater than or equal to the minimum. Extended Description Some products use signed integers or floats even when their values are only expected to be positive or 0. An input validation check might assume that the value is positive, and only check for the maximum value. If the value is negative, but the code assumes that the value is positive, this can produce an error. The error may have security consequences if the negative value is used for memory allocation, array access, buffer access, etc. Ultimately, the error could lead to a buffer overflow or other type of memory corruption. The use of a negative number in a positive-only context could have security implications for other types of resources. For example, a shopping cart might check that the user is not requesting more than 10 items, but a request for -3 items could cause the application to calculate a negative price and credit the attacker's account. Alternate Terms
Signed comparison: | The "signed comparison" term is often used to describe when the product uses a signed variable and checks it to ensure that it is less than a maximum value (typically a maximum buffer size), but does not verify that it is greater than 0. |
Common Consequences This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
---|
Integrity Confidentiality Availability
| Technical Impact: Modify Application Data; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands An attacker could modify the structure of the message or data being sent to the downstream component, possibly injecting commands. | | Availability
| Technical Impact: DoS: Resource Consumption (Other) in some contexts, a negative value could lead to resource consumption. | | Confidentiality Integrity
| Technical Impact: Modify Memory; Read Memory If a negative value is used to access memory, buffers, or other indexable structures, it could access memory outside the bounds of the buffer. | |
Potential Mitigations
Phase: Implementation Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion If the number to be used is always expected to be positive, change the variable type from signed to unsigned or size_t. |
Phase: Implementation Strategy: Input Validation If the number to be used could have a negative value based on the specification (thus requiring a signed value), but the number should only be positive to preserve code correctness, then include a check to ensure that the value is positive. |
Relationships This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore. Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000) Nature | Type | ID | Name |
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ChildOf | Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 1023 | Incomplete Comparison with Missing Factors | CanPrecede | Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | CanPrecede | Base - a weakness
that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 124 | Buffer Underwrite ('Buffer Underflow') | CanPrecede | Variant - a weakness
that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 195 | Signed to Unsigned Conversion Error | CanPrecede | Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. | 682 | Incorrect Calculation |
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore. Relevant to the view "Software Development" (CWE-699) Nature | Type | ID | Name |
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MemberOf | Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 189 | Numeric Errors |
Demonstrative Examples Example 1 The following code is intended to read an incoming packet from a socket and extract one or more headers. (bad code) Example Language: C
DataPacket *packet; int numHeaders; PacketHeader *headers;
sock=AcceptSocketConnection(); ReadPacket(packet, sock); numHeaders =packet->headers;
if (numHeaders > 100) { ExitError("too many headers!"); } headers = malloc(numHeaders * sizeof(PacketHeader); ParsePacketHeaders(packet, headers);
The code performs a check to make sure that the packet does not contain too many headers. However, numHeaders is defined as a signed int, so it could be negative. If the incoming packet specifies a value such as -3, then the malloc calculation will generate a negative number (say, -300 if each header can be a maximum of 100 bytes). When this result is provided to malloc(), it is first converted to a size_t type. This conversion then produces a large value such as 4294966996, which may cause malloc() to fail or to allocate an extremely large amount of memory (CWE-195). With the appropriate negative numbers, an attacker could trick malloc() into using a very small positive number, which then allocates a buffer that is much smaller than expected, potentially leading to a buffer overflow. Example 2 The following code reads a maximum size and performs a sanity check on that size. It then performs a strncpy, assuming it will not exceed the boundaries of the array. While the use of "short s" is forced in this particular example, short int's are frequently used within real-world code, such as code that processes structured data. (bad code) Example Language: C
int GetUntrustedInt () { return(0x0000FFFF); }
void main (int argc, char **argv) {
char path[256]; char *input; int i; short s; unsigned int sz;
i = GetUntrustedInt(); s = i; /* s is -1 so it passes the safety check - CWE-697 */ if (s > 256) { DiePainfully("go away!\n"); }
/* s is sign-extended and saved in sz */ sz = s;
/* output: i=65535, s=-1, sz=4294967295 - your mileage may vary */ printf("i=%d, s=%d, sz=%u\n", i, s, sz);
input = GetUserInput("Enter pathname:");
/* strncpy interprets s as unsigned int, so it's treated as MAX_INT ( CWE-195), enabling buffer overflow ( CWE-119) */ strncpy(path, input, s); path[255] = '\0'; /* don't want CWE-170 */ printf("Path is: %s\n", path);
}
This code first exhibits an example of CWE-839, allowing "s" to be a negative number. When the negative short "s" is converted to an unsigned integer, it becomes an extremely large positive integer. When this converted integer is used by strncpy() it will lead to a buffer overflow (CWE-119). Example 3 In the following code, the method retrieves a value from an array at a specific array index location that is given as an input parameter to the method (bad code) Example Language: C
int getValueFromArray(int *array, int len, int index) {
int value;
// check that the array index is less than the maximum
// length of the array
if (index < len) {
// get the value at the specified index of the array
value = array[index];
}
// if array index is invalid then output error message
// and return value indicating error
else { printf("Value is: %d\n", array[index]); value = -1; }
return value;
}
However, this method only verifies that the given array index is less than the maximum length of the array but does not check for the minimum value (CWE-839). This will allow a negative value to be accepted as the input array index, which will result in a out of bounds read (CWE-125) and may allow access to sensitive memory. The input array index should be checked to verify that is within the maximum and minimum range required for the array (CWE-129). In this example the if statement should be modified to include a minimum range check, as shown below. (good code) Example Language: C
...
// check that the array index is within the correct
// range of values for the array
if (index >= 0 && index < len) {
...
Example 4 The following code shows a simple BankAccount class with deposit and withdraw methods. (bad code) Example Language: Java
public class BankAccount {
public final int MAXIMUM_WITHDRAWAL_LIMIT = 350;
// variable for bank account balance
private double accountBalance;
// constructor for BankAccount
public BankAccount() { accountBalance = 0; }
// method to deposit amount into BankAccount
public void deposit(double depositAmount) {...}
// method to withdraw amount from BankAccount
public void withdraw(double withdrawAmount) {
if (withdrawAmount < MAXIMUM_WITHDRAWAL_LIMIT) {
double newBalance = accountBalance - withdrawAmount; accountBalance = newBalance;
} else { System.err.println("Withdrawal amount exceeds the maximum limit allowed, please try again..."); ... }
}
// other methods for accessing the BankAccount object
...
}
The withdraw method includes a check to ensure that the withdrawal amount does not exceed the maximum limit allowed, however the method does not check to ensure that the withdrawal amount is greater than a minimum value (CWE-129). Performing a range check on a value that does not include a minimum check can have significant security implications, in this case not including a minimum range check can allow a negative value to be used which would cause the financial application using this class to deposit money into the user account rather than withdrawing. In this example the if statement should the modified to include a minimum range check, as shown below. (good code) Example Language: Java
public class BankAccount {
public final int MINIMUM_WITHDRAWAL_LIMIT = 0; public final int MAXIMUM_WITHDRAWAL_LIMIT = 350;
...
// method to withdraw amount from BankAccount
public void withdraw(double withdrawAmount) {
if (withdrawAmount < MAXIMUM_WITHDRAWAL_LIMIT && withdrawAmount > MINIMUM_WITHDRAWAL_LIMIT) {
Note that this example does not protect against concurrent access to the BankAccount balance variable, see CWE-413 and CWE-362. While it is out of scope for this example, note that the use of doubles or floats in financial calculations may be subject to certain kinds of attacks where attackers use rounding errors to steal money. Observed Examples Reference | Description |
| Chain: integer overflow ( CWE-190) causes a negative signed value, which later bypasses a maximum-only check ( CWE-839), leading to heap-based buffer overflow ( CWE-122). |
| Chain: 16-bit counter can be interpreted as a negative value, compared to a 32-bit maximum value, leading to buffer under-write. |
| Chain: kernel's lack of a check for a negative value leads to memory corruption. |
| Chain: parser uses atoi() but does not check for a negative value, which can happen on some platforms, leading to buffer under-write. |
| Chain: Negative value stored in an int bypasses a size check and causes allocation of large amounts of memory. |
| Chain: negative offset value to IOCTL bypasses check for maximum index, then used as an array index for buffer under-read. |
| chain: file transfer client performs signed comparison, leading to integer overflow and heap-based buffer overflow. |
| chain: negative ID in media player bypasses check for maximum index, then used as an array index for buffer under-read. |
Vulnerability Mapping Notes Usage: ALLOWED (this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities) | Reason: Acceptable-Use | Rationale: This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities. | Comments: Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction. |
References
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald
and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 6, "Type Conversion Vulnerabilities" Page 246. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
|
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald
and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 6, "Comparisons", Page 265. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
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